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Abstract. E-consumers face biggest challenge of opting for the best
bidding strategies for competing in an environment of multiple and si-
multaneous online auctions for same or similar items. It becomes very
complicated for the bidders to make decisions of selecting which auction
to participate in, place single or multiple bids, early or late bidding and
how much to bid. In this paper, we present the design of an autonomous
dynamic bidding agent (ADBA) that makes these decisions on behalf
of the buyers according to their bidding behaviors. The agent develops
a comprehensive method for initial price prediction and an integrated
model for bid forecasting. The initial price prediction method selects an
auction to participate in and then predicts its closing price (initial price).
Then the bid forecasting model forecasts the bid amount by designing
different bidding strategies followed by the late bidders. The experimen-
tal results demonstrated improved initial price prediction outcomes by
proposing a clustering based approach. Also, the results show the profi-
ciency of the bidding strategies amongst the late bidders with desire for
bargain.
Keywords: Online auctions, Software agents, Bid forecasting, Bidding
strategies, Data mining, Clustering
1 Introduction
The online auctions have received an extreme surge of popularity in the past few
years. In the online auctions’ business model, traders purchase or sell products
governed by specific trading rules over the internet supporting different auction
formats. There are four standard online auction formats: English auction; Dutch
auction; First-price sealed-bid; and Second-price sealed-bid [1] [2]. English auc-
tions are the most common auction type employed by the online auctioneers
in eBay, Amazon etc. Bidders participating in this marketplace often face a
challenge to opt for the most favorable bidding strategies to win the auction.
Moreover, there are always a number of multiple auctions selling the desired
item at the same time. This foster the complicated situation of the bidders in
making decisions of selecting which auction to participate in, placing single or
multiple bids, bidding early or late and how much to bid [3] [4]. These hard
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and time consuming processes of analyzing, selecting and making bids and mon-
itoring are needed to be automated to assist the buyers while bidding. Software
agents can promisingly act upon these tasks on behalf of the traders. These
are the software tools that can execute autonomously, communicates with other
agents or the user and monitors the state of its execution environment effec-
tively. These negotiating agents outperform their human counterparts because
of their systematic approach to execute complex decision making situations [5]
[6]. The software agents make decisions on behalf of the consumer and endeavor
to guarantee the delivery of the item according to the bidder′s behavior.
In eBay auctions, a bidder with the highest value wins and he pays the
second-highest maximum price. However, the bidders do not bid their maximum
values either because they have trouble understanding that they should bid their
maximum value or they have trouble simply figuring out what their maximum
value is. Closing price prediction of the auction can help the bidders in setting
their maximum valuation of the auctioned item. Furthermore, the bidders adjust
their bids towards the maximum valuation of the item repeatedly in response
to the remaining time left of the auction and the bids placed by the other par-
ticipants, which leads to the different bidding behavior. According to different
bidding behaviors, we can categorize agents as evaluators, participators, oppor-
tunists, skeptics, snipers, unmaskers or shill bidders [7] [8] [9]. Moreover, late
bidding in online auctions has aroused a good deal of attention [10] [11] [12].
Late bidders appear near to the closing hours of an auction. This is a very com-
mon behavior by the bidders in an eBay style auction with hard closing rules.
Late bidding may be a best response to a variety of incremental bidding strate-
gies because they can better realize the state of the auction by observing its
historical data. So there is a need to design a mechanism which decides the bid
amount at particular moment of time according to the bidding behavior of the
late bidders.
Predicting the closing price of an online auction is a challenging task be-
cause it depends on auction′s attributes which are dynamic in nature [13]. This
bid amount can be forecasted effectively by analyzing the data produced as an
auction progresses (historical data). Analysis of plethora of data produced in
the online auction environment can be done by using data mining techniques to
predict the closing price of an online auction [14] [15]. Data from a series of the
same or similar auctions closed in the past has been used to forecast the win-
ning bid by exploiting regression, classification and regression tree, multi-class
classification and multiple binary classification tasks [16] [17]. Also the history
of an ongoing auction contains significant information and is exploited for the
short term forecasting of the next bid by using support vector machines, func-
tional k-nearest neighbor, clustering, regression and classification techniques [13]
[15] [18]. However, these forecasted bids have hardly been used to improve the
behavior of the software agents in online auctions.
This article develops an automated dynamic bidding agent (ADBA) that
will use the data mining techniques to improve its behavior for bid forecasting
according to different bidding strategies followed by the late bidders. ADBA
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selects an auction to participate in and predicts its closing price by adopting
a clustering, and bid mapping and selection approach. Then the bidding agent
models the bid amount for a given behavior based on the predicted closing price
of the selected auction and the negotiation decision functions by Faratin et al
[19]. These negotiation decisions are made based on the strategies generated by
the bidding agent following different behaviors of the late bidders.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the
design of the Automated Dynamic Bidding Agent. Section 3 depicts experimental
results evaluating the performance of the closing price prediction method and
the success rate of the bidding strategies designed for different bidding behaviors
of the late bidders. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Automated Dynamic Bidding Agent-ADBA
The bidding agent consists of two primary components: an initial price estimator,
and a bid forecaster. The initial price estimator is responsible for the selection of
an ongoing auction for participation and for predicting the closing price of the
selected auction. The predicted closing price of the selected auction acts as the
initial price for the bid forecaster. The bid forecaster utilizes this initial price for
forecasting the bid amount for the selected ongoing auction based on different
bidding strategies followed by the late bidders. The automated dynamic bidding
agent (ADBA) is represented in Fig. 1.
2.1 Initial Price Estimator
The initial price estimator selects an auction to participate and predicts the
closing price of the selected auction based on a clustering, and a bid mapping and
selection approach. Formally our approach consists of four steps. First, historical
data is extracted as per the requirements to form the agents’ knowledge base
for online auctions. Secondly, k − estimator agent determines the best number
of partitions for the overall auction data. Thirdly, the set of similar auctions
are clustered together in k groups and finally, based on the transformed data
after clustering and the characteristics of the current auctions, bid mapping and
selection component nominates the cluster for each of the ongoing auctions to
select the auction for participation, and the closing price of the selected auction
will be predicted.
Data Preprocessing Let A be the set of the attributes collected for each
auction then A = {a1, a2, ..., aj}, where j is the total number of attributes.
Different types of auctions are categorized based on some predefined attributes
from the vast feature space of online auctions. The feature space may include
average bid amount, average bid rate, number of bids, item type, seller rep-
utation, opening bid, closing bid, quantity available, type of auction, dura-
tion of the auction, buyer reputation and many more. In this paper, to clas-
sify different types of auctions, we focus on only a set of attributes; opening
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Fig. 1. Automated Dynamic Bidding Agent
bid, closing price, number of bids, average bid amount and average bid rate.
Now A = {OpenBi, ClosePi, NUMi, AvgBi, AvgBRi}, where A be the set of
attributes for an auction, OpenBi and ClosePi be the starting price and the
end price of ith auction. NUMi be the total number of bids placed in i
th auc-
tion. AvgBi be the average bid amount of i
th auction and can be calculated
as Avg(B1, B2, .....Bl). where B1 be the 1
st bid amount, B2 be the second bid
amount and Bl be the last bid amount for i
th auction. AvgBRi be the average






ti+1 − ti (1)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Bi+1 be the amount of (i + 1)th bid, Bi be the amount of ith
bid, ti+1 is the time at which (i+ 1)
th bid is placed and ti is the time at which
ith bid is placed.
K-estimator To decide the value of k in k −means algorithm is a recurrent
problem in clustering and is a distinct issue from the process of actually solving
the clustering problem. The optimal choice of k is often ambiguous, increasing
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the value of k always reduce the error and increases the computation speed.
The most favorable method to find k adopts a strategy which balances between
maximum compression of the data using a single cluster, and maximum accuracy
by assigning each data point to its own cluster. In this paper the value of k in
k −means algorithm is determined by employing elbow method using one way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) [20].
Cluster Analysis A clustering based method is used to predict the closing
price of the multiple ongoing auctions for autonomous agent based system. In
the proposed methodology the input auctions are partitioned into groups of
similar auctions depending on their different characteristics. This partitioning
has been done by using k −means clustering algorithm [20].
Bid Mapping and Selection In order to decide that the current ongoing
auctions belong to which cluster, the bid mapping and selection component is
activated. Based on the transformed data after clustering and the characteristics
of the current auctions, it nominates the cluster for each of the ongoing auction
to select the auction to participate in and to predict its closing price.
We observe that in 92 of the 149 auctions of our dataset, winner first appear
in the last hour of the auction, which account for the 62% of the total auctions,
consistent with the late bidding attitude of the bidders recognized in the online
auction literature [10] [11] [12]. Clustering has divided the auction data into the
groups of auctions having distinct range of average bid rate (AvgBR) values. It
has been observed that the value of AvgBR in 78% of the completed auctions
belong to the same cluster as at the beginning of the last hour of the auction.
So the ongoing auctions are mapped to the clusters based on their AvgBR value
in the beginning of the last hour. The methodology for selecting the auction for
participation and predicting the closing price is described as follows:
Let OA be the set of multiple ongoing auctions and OA = OA1 ∪ OA2 ∪
... ∪ OAk. where OAi be the set of ongoing auctions belonging to the ith clus-
ter and i = 1, 2, ...k where k is the total number of clusters. Then OAi =
{OAil, OAi2, ...OAin} where n is the total number of ongoing auctions belonging
to the ith cluster. Let AvgBi be the set of average bid amounts of the ongoing
auctions belonging to the ith cluster at the beginning of the last hour then
AvgBi = {AvgBil, AvgBi2, ...AvgBin}. Let AvgBCi be the average bid amount
of all the auctions in the ith cluster. A subset of OA will be selected where
AvgBin < AvgBCi, where i = 1, 2, ...k. Then the auction with the minimum
value of the average bid amount will be selected for the participation.
The closing price prediction task for the selected auction is treated as a
multiple regression task [20]. The predicted closing price of the selected auction
is treated as the initial price (pi) by the bid forecaster.
2.2 Bid Forecaster
This section forecasts the bid amount for the selected ongoing auction by de-
signing the bidding strategies for different bidding behaviors of the buyer. We
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classify the late bidders’ behavior based on the single or multiple bids placements
and are further categorized based on the time of the bid placement Fig. 2.
The late bidders who place single bid are Mystical and Sturdy. The mystical
bidders place single bid in the last five minutes of the auction. The sturdy bidders
place single bid in the last hour of the auction. The late bidders who place
multiple bids are Desperate and Strategic. The desperate bidders continuously
bid for an item multiple numbers of times without any other participants in
between. The strategic bidders also place multiple bids to win the auction in the
last hour; however, these bidders increment their bid amount strategically based
on the bids placed by the other participants. The bidding strategies are designed
Fig. 2. Bidding Behaviors of the late bidders
for the above bidding behaviors of the buyers. The bidding agent models the bid
amount based on the initial price (pi) and the negotiation decision functions
by Faratin et al [19] for each bidding bahevior in Fig. 2. The purpose of these
functions is to determine how to compute the bid amount at a particular moment
of time. These negotiation decisions may depend upon the remaining time of the
auction or on the bids placed by the other participants (competition).
Let F (t) be the function to determine the bid amount based on the remaining
time left and let Fc(t) be the function to determine the bid amount based on the
competition in the auction. Let the agent bids at time 0 ≤ t ≤ tmax . Agent′s
bidding limit is [minb,maxb]. Then,
F (t) = minb + α(t)(maxb −minb) (2)
where α(t) = k+(1−k)(min(t,tmax)tmax )
1
β A wide range of time dependent functions
can be calculated by varying the value of α(t). where 0 ≤ α(0) ≤ 1 , α(0) = k
and α(tmax) = 1 k is a constant and 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. When k is multiplied by the
size of the bid interval, it gives the value of the starting bid amount. β is a
constant which belongs to R+. A number of possible bidding regulations can be
obtained by varying the value of β. When β < 1, minimum bid amount will be
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maintained until the tmax is almost reached and when β > 1, agent quickly goes
to its reservation price pr (maximum willingness to pay) where pr = pi = maxb.
Fc(t) compute the bid amount at time t based on the attitude of the other
participants who placed the previous bids. To calculate Fc(t) at a particular
moment of time t, agent reproduces the behavior of the other participants δ ≥ 1





Where F ′(t) be the bids placed by the other participants at time t. The value
of minb depends on the bidding strategy followed.
Mystical Bidding Strategy In this strategy agent places single bid in the last
five minutes of the auction. This bid amount depends upon the remaining time
as well as the competition in the auction.
The bid amount at time t for the mystical behavior will be calculated as
the average of F (t) as in (2) and Fc(t) in (3). Here, minb is the lower bound
of the bid value at the start of the last five minutes of the auction. The values
for k and β are set according to the behavior of the bidders. Mystical bidders
commonly possess two behaviors, first, they may be desperate to get the item,
and secondly, they may be willing to bargain for that item. For the mystical
bidders having desperate behavior, the value of k will be high and β > 1, since
this type of bidders bid at a price near to the reservation price pr. On the other
hand, for the mystical bidders with a desire for bargain behavior, the value of k
will be low and β < 1.
Sturdy Bidding Strategy This strategy is similar to the mystical bidding
behavior with an exception of the time of placing a bid. A bidder with sturdy
behavior places a single bid at the beginning of the last hour of the auction based
on the remaining time and the competition in the auction.
F (t) and Fc(t) functions similar to the mystical behavior are used to compute
the bid amount, but here minb is the lower bound of the bid amount at the
beginning of the last hour. The sturdy bidders also appeared in two behaviors;
desperate, and desire to get bargain. The values for k and β for sturdy bidders
with desperate and desire to get bargain behaviors follow the same conventions
as in the mystical bidders.
Desperate Bidding Strategy Desperate bidders place multiple bids contin-
uously during the last hour of the auction. The first bid placed by the bidder
depends on the remaining time left and the competition in the auction. Rest of
the bids he places based on the remaining time left of the auction.
The starting bid will be calculated as the average of F (t) and Fc(t). All the
other bids will be calculated from F (t). The value of the minb is the same as
in the sturdy bidding strategy. As a desperate bidder starts bidding at a value
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close to his valuation for the item, the values for k are high for this bidding
strategy. Here β > 1, since desperate bidders tend to quickly reach at pr before
the deadline is reached by placing multiple bids continuously.
Strategic Bidding Strategy Strategic bidding strategy is similar to the des-
perate behavior with one key difference in the way of placement of the bids.
Strategic bidders place each and every bid strategically based on the bids placed
by the other participants in the auction. They continue bidding till the bid
amount reaches their reservation price pr.
Each bid will be calculated as the average of F (t) and Fc(t) . The value of
the minb is the same as in the sturdy bidding strategy. Strategic bidders do not
start biding at an amount close to pr; rather they increase their bid amount
slowly based on the other bids in the auction. So the values for k are low and
β < 1 for the strategic behavior.
3 Experimentation
The performance of our bidding agent is assessed by undertaking an empirical
evaluation of the automated dynamic bidding agent (ADBA) in two phases.
In the first phase, the methodology for the initial estimation is validated, and
in the second phase, the success rate of the bidding agent following different
behaviors of the buyers is analyzed. The dataset for our experimentation includes
the complete bidding records for 149 auctions for new Palm M515 PDAs. The
statistical description of the data is explained in [21].
3.1 Initial Price Estimation
The initial price estimator selects an auction to participate and estimates its
closing price based on the clustering and bid mapping approach. This predicted
closing price act as the initial price for the bid forecaster. Auction for participa-
tion is selected based on the bid mapping and selecting technique. Closing price
of the selected auction is predicted by exploiting clustering and multiple linear
regression approach [20]. In the proposed approach closing price of an online
auction is predicted in two scenarios. First, it is predicted by exploiting multiple
linear regressions on whole input auctions data. Second, by exploiting multiple
linear regression on each cluster which are generated by applying k − means
algorithm on whole input auctions data. The results are evaluated by comparing
the root mean square errors (RMSEs) in both of these scenarios. Experimental
results demonstrated less RMSEs for the prediction results when multiple linear
regression is applied on each cluster rather than on whole input auctions data
[20].
3.2 Success rate of the bidding agents
Bid forecaster forecasts the bid amount for the selected ongoing auction based
on the different bidding strategies followed by the bidder. A bidding agent with
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the bidding behavior which only depends on the F (t) not on F ′(t) is opted as a
basis for the comparison. To compute the function Fc(tn+1), the initial values of
F ′(tn−2δ+2), F ′(tn−2δ) and F (tn−1) are calculated at δ = 1 for all the bidding
strategies i.e. Mystical, Sturdy, Desperate and Strategic. For sturdy, desperate
and strategic behaviors δ = 1 at the beginning of the last hour of the auction. For
Mystical behavior, δ = 1 at the beginning of the last five minutes of the auction.
F ′(tn−2δ+2) and F ′(tn−2δ) are calculated as the percentage of the reservation
price (pr) reached at time t = n − 2δ and at t = n − 2δ + 2. F (tn−1) is the
average of F ′(tn−2δ+2) and F ′(tn−2δ). The percentage of the reservation price
(pr) reached at time tn−2δ+2 and tn−2δ for all the bidding strategies are as shown
in the Table 1 (δ = 1).
Table 1. Percentage of reservation price (pr) at time t = n − 2δ + 2 and t = n − 2δ
for different bidding strategies





In this set of experiments, the values for k and β depend on the selected bid-
ding strategy for the bidding agent. Let MSTd and MSTb represent the mystical
bidders with desperate and desire to bargain behavior respectively. STDd and
STDb represent the sturdy bidders with desperate and desire to bargain behav-
ior respectively. DSP and STG represent the desperate and strategic bidders.
The values for k and β chosen for these behaviors are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Choice of k and β for different bidding strategies
Bidding Strategy k β
MSTd 0.6 ≤ k ≤ 1 β > 1
MSTb 0 ≤ k ≤ 0.3 β < 1
STDd 0.6 ≤ k ≤ 1 β > 1
STDb 0 ≤ k ≤ 0.3 β < 1
DSP 0.6 ≤ k ≤ 1 β > 1
STG 0 ≤ k ≤ 0.6 β < 1
The bid amount selected by these bidding strategies depend upon the re-
maining time of the auction and on the bids placed by the other participants
(competition). There are basically two types of bidders. They may be desperate
to have the item or they may be willing to bargain to acquire the item being
auctioned. Desperate bidders start bidding at higher price close to his reserva-
tion value pr and their bid amount is less affected by the amount of bids placed
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by the other bidders due to their desperate behavior. MSTd, STDd,and DSP
bidding strategies follow this type of behavior. The bidders who are willing to
bargain always bids strategically based on the bids placed by the other com-
petitors. MSTb , STDb and STG follow this type of behavior. As the bidding
strategies described above select the bids based on the remaining time as well as
on the bids placed by the other participants (competition), these strategies will
be successful when the bidder has a desire to bargain behavior. So we will dis-
cuss the performance of the agents acting strategically based on the bids placed
by the other participants. The bidding agents with the behavior which only de-
pends on the F (t) not on F ′(t) are opted as the basis for the comparison for
each bidding strategy. The performance of all the agents following these bidding
strategies is shown in Fig. 3. The performance of the agents is measured in terms
of the number of times he wins the auction.
Fig. 3. Percentage of winning auction comparision
Results show that the strategy STG performed best followed by MSTb and
then STDb. The agent following strategy STG has won all the auctions because
he bids strategically based on the amount of the bids placed by the other partici-
pants and the remaining time of the auction. He continue bidding till he gets the
item or the bid reaches at his reservation price. (In our experiments we assume
that closing price of the item ≤ pr for the agent and pr for the agent ≥ pr for
the competitor).
Fig. 4. Choosing Bidding strategy
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To explain the performance of the agents following MSTb and STDb strategy,
the levels of the desire for bargain attitude are distinguished as low, medium and
high depending on the value of k . It has been observed that the mystical agent
wins in 75% of the auctions. The winning bidders have medium to high level of
desire for bargain for having the item. The bidders with low level of desire for
bargain place bids based on the remaining time of the auction. Their bid amount
has been less affected by the bids of the competitors because of their attitude
of single bidding in last five minutes of the auction. The agent following STDb
wins in 25% of the auctions. The winning bidders possess high level of desire
for bargain behavior. The sturdy bidders with low and medium level of desire
for bargain place bids based on the remaining time of the auction. Their bid
amount has been less affected by the bids of the competitors because of their
attitude of single bidding at the beginning of the last hour of the auction. The
most suitable bidding strategy based on the desire of the bargain for the bidder
has been shown in Fig. 4.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we presented an automated dynamic bidding agent (ADBA) that
uses data mining techniques to improve its behavior for bid forecasting accord-
ing to different bidding strategies followed by late bidders. The bidding agent
primarily performs three tasks; first, it decides which auction to bid in, sec-
ondly, predicts the closing price of the selected auction, and finally, models the
bid amount for a given bidding behavior of the bidders. Auction selection and
the closing price prediction adopt a clustering, and bid mapping and selection
approach. The ADBA forecasts the bid amount for the selected ongoing auction
by designing the bidding strategies based on the bidding behavior of the bid-
ders. Bidding strategies are designed according to the predicted closing price and
the negotiation decision functions for the specific bidding behaviors. By allow-
ing negotiation decision functions for different bidding behaviors of the buyers,
ADBA presents improved bid forecasting results than the DC mechanism [15].
The outcome of the clustering based model for the closing price prediction is
compared with the classic model for price prediction. The improvement in the
error measure for each cluster for a set of attributes gives support in favor of
the proposed model using clustering. Our experimental results demonstrated the
proficiency of the designed bidding strategies for the late bidders with different
levels of desire for bargain behavior.
References
1. Ockenfels, A., D.H. Reiley Jr, A. Sadrieh: Online auctions. National Bureau of
Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA (2006)
2. Haruvy, E.: Internet auctions. Foundations and Trends in Marketing, vol. 4, issue.
1, pp. 1-75 (2009).
12 P.Kaur, M.Goyal, J.Lu
3. Park, Y.H., E.T. Bradlow: An integrated model for bidding behavior in Internet
auctions: Whether, who, when, and how much. In: Journal of Marketing Research,
vol. 42, issue 4, pp. 470-482 (2005).
4. Jank, W., S. Zhang: An automated and data-driven bidding strategy for online
auctions. In: Journal of Computing, vol. 23, issue 2, pp. 238-253 (2011).
5. Anthony, P., et al.: Autonomous agents for participating in multiple online auc-
tions. In: IJCAI Workshop on E-Business and the Intelligent Web, Seattle, USA,
pp. 54-64 (2001)
6. Greenwald, A., P. Stone: Autonomous bidding agents in the trading agent compe-
tition. In: IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 5, issue 2, pp. 52-60 (2001)
7. Bapna, R., et al.: User heterogeneity and its impact on electronic auction market
design. In: An empirical exploration. Mis Quarterly, vol. 28, issue 1, pp. 21-43
(2004)
8. Shah, H., et al.: Mining eBay: Bidding strategies and shill detection. In: WE-
BKDD 2002-MiningWeb Data for Discovering Usage Patterns and Profiles, pp.
17-34 (2003)
9. Trevathan, J., W. Read: Detecting shill bidding in online English auctions. In:
Handbook of Research on Social and Organizational Liabilities in Information Se-
curity (2008)
10. Du, L., Q. Chen, N. Bian: An Empirical Analysis of Bidding Behavior in Simul-
taneous Ascending-Bid Auctions. In: International Conference on E-Business and
E-Government (ICEE), IEEE (2010)
11. Rasmusen, E.B., Strategic implications of uncertainty over one’s own private value
in auctions. In: The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, vol. 6,pp–. 7(2006)
12. Ockenfels, A., A.E. Roth: Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auc-
tions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction. In:
Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 55, issue 2 pp. 297-320 (2006).
13. Xuefeng, L., et al.: Predicting the final prices of online auction items. In: Expert
Systems with Applications, vol. 31, issue 3, pp. 542-550 (2006).
14. Nikolaidou, V., P. Mitkas: A Sequence Mining Method to Predict the Bidding
Strategy of Trading Agents. In: Agents and Data Mining Interaction. p p. 139-151
(2009)
15. Kehagias, D.D.,P.A. Mitkas: Efficient E-Commerce Agent Design Based on Clus-
tering eBay Data. In: International Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent
Agent Technology Workshops, IEEE/WIC/ACM ( 2007)
16. Heijst, D., R. Potharst, M. Wezel: A support system for predicting ebay end prices.
Econometric Institute Report (2006)
17. Ghani, R., H. Simmons: Predicting the end-price of online auctions ( 2004).
18. Zhang, S., W. Jank, G. Shmuel: Real-time forecasting of online auctions via func-
tional k-nearest neighbors. In: International Journal of Forecasting, vol. 26, issue
4pp. 666-683 (2010)
19. Faratin, P., C. Sierra, N.R. Jennings: Negotiation decision functions for au-
tonomous agents. In: Robotics and Autonomous Systems, vol. 24 pp. 159-182
(1998)
20. Kaur, P., M. Goyal, J. Lu: Data mining driven agents for predicting online auction’s
end price. In IEEE Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Data Mining
(CIDM). IEEE, Paris, pp. 141-147 (2011)
21. Kaur, P., M. Goyal, J. Lu: Pricing Analysis in Online Auctions Using Clustering
and Regression Tree Approach. In: Agents and Data Mining Interaction, L. Cao,
et al., Editors., Springer Berlin / Heidelberg. pp. 248-257 (2012)
